Capital flow in a two-component dynamical system by Slanina, Frantisek & Zhang, Yi-Cheng
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/9
90
62
49
v2
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  2
2 J
un
 19
99
Capital flow in a two-component dynamical system
Frantiˇsek Slanina
Institute of Physics, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Na Slovance 2, CZ-18221 Praha, Czech Republic
and Center for Theoretical Study, Jilska´ 1,CZ-11000 Praha, Czech Republic
e-mail: slanina@fzu.cz
Yi-Cheng Zhang
Institut de Physique The´orique, Universite´ de Fribourg, Pe´rolles, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
A model of open economics composed of producers and speculators is investigated by numerical sim-
ulations. The capital flows from the environment to the producers and from them to the speculators.
The price fluctuations are suppressed by the speculators. When the aggressivity of the speculators
grows, there is a transition from the regime with almost sure profit to a very risky regime in which
very small fraction of speculators have stable gain. The minimum of price fluctuations occurs close
to the transition.
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a, 89.90.+n
I. INTRODUCTION
Economy is an intriguing complex dynamical system,
understanding of which has vital importance to the soci-
ety [1–4]. From the point of view of a physicist, it may be
seen as a natural phenomenon, whose microscopic “laws
of motion” should be discovered and consequences drawn
from them, amenable to experimental verification (or fal-
sification). Statistical physics is successfully involved in
investigation of various collective dynamic phenomena,
which come from interdisciplinary areas, like car traffic
[5], city growth [6], pedestrian dynamics [7], forest fires
[8], river networks [9] or biological evolution [10].
Like in these problems, numerical simulations of vari-
ous “minimal” models of economic behavior [11–29] play
important role, in parallel with analytical approaches
[29–36]. Even though the hope of detailed prediction
of the future market behavior could be (at least very
probably) rarely satisfied, the knowledge of parameters,
which are crucial for the probabilistic properties of the
economic events is very important to the decision-makers
on all levels.
One group of models investigated so far is based on
threshold dynamics of the players in the market [11–13]
which was shown to be equivalent to a stochastic process
with both multiplicative and additive noise [32,13] which
then leads naturally (see e. g. [37–40]) to the power law
tails in the distribution of price changes, which are ob-
served in reality [41]. Similar in spirit are the models
based on a diffusion-annihilation process, where buyers
and sellers are considered as particles which disappear
once they meet [14,33]. The percolation theory was in-
voked to account for the herd behavior of market agents
[30,31,15,42], which gives a power law distribution trun-
cated by an exponential, if the connectivity of players is
close but not exactly at the percolation threshold. This
is in accord with the “truncated Le´vy” distribution found
in more refined recent analyses of stock market data
[43,30,44,45]. A model based on non-linear Langevin
equation was developed [34] in order to explain the ap-
parent “phase transition” character of market crashes,
proposed recently by several authors. (See e. g. [46–51].)
Another model, which implements on-line adaptation
of the community of players [17] is able to reproduce very
well also the scaling of price changes [44,45,52,53]. More
abstract approach is used in the minority game model
[18–29], where real money is lacking. An important fea-
ture of this model is the presence of a transition from
chaotic to periodic phase, when the number of players is
increased. (It is quite interesting, that similar transition
seems to take place also in the threshold dynamics model
[13]; when increasing the number of players, we may pass
from the intermittent behavior characterized by power-
law tails to an ordinary random-walk process. However,
this phenomenon was not explicitly investigated in [13].)
In our model, we want to take into account the fact,
that there are at least two types of investors. First, there
are individuals who product some commodity and need
other commodities to keep the production on. It is the
latter type of economical subject, that the market was
originally designed for. However, the second type of in-
vestor comes soon, a speculator, who observes the price
changes due to disequilibrium between demand and of-
fer, and makes profit from the information carried by the
price signal. However, it is expected, that the influence
of speculators is not at all purely negative. When they
discover some regularity in the price fluctuations, they
make many of it, but at the same time their activity has
a feedback effect on the price, so that the very fluctu-
ations the speculators are exploiting are destroyed. In
fact, this may lead to overall decrease of price fluctua-
tions, making the market more stable.
The question is, whether this common sense reasoning
can be supported by more rigorous arguments. The scope
of the present work is to implement a model of market, in
which the mutual influence of producers and speculators
may be studied.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE TWO-COMPONENT
MODEL
Economy is an open system. Like thermodynamic sys-
tems can self-organize into a low-entropy state only under
condition that there is flow of energy through the system,
non-trivial self-organization in the market is driven by
the supply of wealth from the surrounding environment.
So, first fundamental players in the economic game are
producers, which exploit the outside opportunities. In
our model, their real economic activity will be mimicked
by buying and selling a single commodity in a regular
manner. For simplicity, we will call it stock. Each pro-
ducer is supplied periodically fixed amount of stock and
money from the outside.
Real market needs also speculators, which play a pos-
itive role in absorbing temporary disequilibrium of de-
mand and offer. The result is a more liquid market with
reduced fluctuations. The speculators are selfish, but
without any explicit wish, besides the net gain. We may
look at them as providers of a service, for which they
are paid. However, none of them provides individually a
specific service, but their utility stems from a collective
effect.
An important feature of our model is the possibility
of both producers and speculators to abstain from the
game, if they feel that it does not pay to participate. So,
the number of players in each group is self-adjusted, de-
pending on the parameters of the model. This is similar
in spirit to the grand-canonical ensemble in statistical
physics.
Borrowing the biological terminology, the producers
are “autotrophs” who live in a symbiosis with “het-
erotrophic” speculators. Like in biological communities,
we implement here also Darwinian evolution of the spec-
ulators, so that they adapt collectively to the actions of
producers.
Let us be more specific now. The dynamical system we
are going to investigate is a simplified model of a market,
in discrete time. In each step, some amount of stock is
traded. The price of stock x(t) as a function of time t is
the output signal of the market. The price is the man-
ifestation of large amount of “microscopic” activity due
to players on the market. Each player is characterized
by two dynamical variables, the amount of stock Si(t)
and the amount of money Bi(t), where index i denotes
the player. So, the total capital owned at time t by i’th
player is Wi(t) = Bi(t) + x(t)Si(t).
There are two kinds of players in our model. There
are Np producers and Ns speculators. We denote N =
Np + Ns the total number of players. The producers
follow a fixed strategy of buying and selling, irrespective
of the current or past price. On the other hand, the
decisions of speculators are based on the analysis of the
past evolution of price.
The strategies are characterized as follows. Each pro-
ducer, i = 1, 2, ..., Np has its own period τi and time-scale
Ti on which he or she invests. The periods are chosen
randomly among numbers 2 to 6, the time-scales ran-
domly from 7 to 10. The investment follows a random
but quenched pattern ai(t
′), t′ = 0, 1, ..., τi − 1. In order
to avoid a systematic excess on the demand or offer side,
we require that the investment is balanced for each pro-
ducer,
∑τi−1
t′=0 ai(t
′) = 0. Apart from this constraint, the
ai’s are drawn from uniform distribution on the interval
(−1, 1) Finally, all producers are given the same overall
amplitude of their investment ǫ. At the time step t, the
producer i participates, if he or she has positive capi-
tal. In this case, he or she attempts to buy the following
amount of the commodity
∆Si = ǫ(ai([t/Ti] mod τi)− λ ln
x(t)
< W >
) . (1)
In this formula, we denote by [t/Ti] integer division of t
by Ti and < W >=
1
N
∑N
i=1Wi is the average wealth of
the players. The last term with the logarithm expresses
the fact, that the stock has its intrinsic value. Its price
is measured relatively to the average wealth of the pop-
ulation, so that if the price is larger, the strategy of the
producer is slightly biased towards selling, while if the
price is lower, the producer is more likely to buy. The
use of logarithm follows from the fact, that the evolution
of price is a multiplicative process, rather than additive
one. Analogical term plays a crucial role also in the an-
alytic approach of Ref. [34]. The parameter λ measures
the strength of the bias caused by the intrinsic value of
the commodity. Throughout this article, we use the value
λ = 0.01.
The speculators differ from the producers in two as-
pects. First, they do not feel the intrinsic value of the
traded product, so that the logarithmic term in the Eq.
(1) is missing. But the crucial difference resides in the
ability of speculators to analyze the past price signal and
decide according to their expectations about the future.
As the producers do, the speculators may have their time-
scales on which they analyze the signal and also different
memory length. However, in the present work we limit
ourselves only to the case when all speculators have their
time-scale equal to one step of the dynamics and memory
is fixed and uniform in the whole community of specula-
tors.
The speculators have memory M . It means that they
are able to use information ofM previous values of price,
x(t), x(t − 1), ..., x(t −M). This sequence is then trans-
formed in a bit string σ = [σ1, σ2, ..., σM ] containing the
information whether the price went up or down in a given
instant in the past. We adopted the convention that 0
means increase and 1 means decrease of the price. There-
fore σj = θ(x(t−j)−x(t−j+1)), where θ(x) is the Heav-
iside function. The strategy of the i-th speculator is the
function which prescribes for each bit string, whether the
speculator should buy or sell. We adopt the convention,
that 0 means selling and 1 buying. Then the strategy is
a function Σi(σ) with possible values 0 or 1.
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The strategy has a score bi(t) counting its success rate
at time t. If it predicted correctly the change of the price
from step t to t+ 1 one point is added to the score, oth-
erwise one point is subtracted. There is in principle a
non-trivial question, what we mean by saying “predicted
correctly the price change”. In fact, it should be checked
a posteriori that the rule we used for distinguishing suc-
cessful strategies corresponds really to winning behavior.
However, in our model, we used a prescription for price
change, which enables us to say a priori which strategy
did a good job. At this moment, we present the rule of
success rate counting and return to the justification of
this rule later, when we will speak of the prescription for
price change. The essence is, that it is good to buy if the
price will go down and vice versa. So, when the player
is inserted in the market, its score is set to zero, and
in each successive step, the score is updated as follows:
bi(t + 1) = bi(t) + 1 if θ(x(t) − x(t + 1)) = Σi(σ(t)) and
bi(t+ 1) = bi(t)− 1 in the opposite case.
There is a Darwinist selection among speculators.
Each 5 steps, the speculator with lowest capital is re-
moved and replaced by new player with newly cho-
sen strategy. However, the capital, amount of stock
and money is inherited from the removed player. This
amounts to not really remove the player, but rather the
player picks new strategy instead of the old doomed one.
We define the age vi(t) of speculator i as number of time
steps since the last replacement of the strategy. We im-
plemented also random mutations, which affect equally
good and bad players. Each 57 steps a player is chosen
at random and its strategy is randomly changed.
If the speculator feels, that the strategy is bad, he or
she may abstain, in order to avoid losses. For the player
i to participate, we require that bi(t)/vi(t) > 0.05.
Those speculators, who do participate, attempt to buy
the following amount of stock:
∆Si = δ(2Σi(σ(t)) − 1) . (2)
When we know what amount of stock the players want
to buy or sell, we can compute the change of price. It
is not clear a priori what precisely the price change
should be. The only obvious requirement is, that the
price should go up, when there is more demand than of-
fer, and go down, when the offer prevails. The demand is
D =
∑
i,∆Si>0
∆Si and the offer O = −
∑
i,∆Si<0
∆Si.
In the previous works, two recipes for the price change
were used. In [17] the time averages of demand and offer
were computed and new price was obtained by multiply-
ing the old price by the ratio of average demand to aver-
age offer. Essentially the same prescription is applied in
[34].
On the other hand, within the approaches based on
threshold dynamics or diffusion-annihilation processes
[13,14] the deal is realized when the bid and ask prices
meet, which determines the reported stock price at that
moment. (It is interesting to note, that between the deals
the price is undefined.)
Here we adopt an approach closer to the former one.
The new price is computed by multiplying the old price
by a factor, which increases with the ratio D/O.
x(t+ 1) = F (
D
O
)x(t) (3)
where the function F (r) should obey two conditions,
F (1) = 1 and F ′(r) > 0. The simplest choice consists
in taking F (r) = r, but as we have seen in our simula-
tions, this leads to price fluctuations far beyond realistic
values. So, we use a non-linear form which suppresses
the fluctuations,
F (r) = exp(α tanh(log(r)/α)) (4)
which has the property that F (r) ≃ r for r close to 1.
We have found that α = 0.02 gives realistic price fluctu-
ations, so we keep this value throughout the simulations.
There should be conservation of stock in each trade
event. Therefore the amount actually traded by a single
player is not the same as the attempted volume. IfD > O
then if ∆Si > 0, actual change of stock is lower than
attempted, ∆Si =
O
D
∆Si. If ∆Si < 0 the actual traded
amount is the same as attempted, ∆Si = ∆Si.
If on the contrary D < O then if ∆Si < 0, ∆Si =
D
O
∆Si, if ∆Si > 0, ∆Si = ∆Si.
After the trade is completed, the new amount of capi-
tal, stock and money is
Wi(t+ 1) = B(t) + x(t+ 1)Si(t) (5)
Si(t+ 1) = Si(t) + ∆Si (6)
Bi(t+ 1) = Bi(t)− x(t+ 1)∆Si (7)
Finally, each 120 steps, the producers receive wealth
from outside. The value of the influx is governed by
the parameter η. The total amount distributed among
producers is ηNp, but who do not participate in that mo-
ment, does not receive anything. If pp is the fraction of
currently participating producers, those who do partici-
pate, increase their capital by η/ps.
Summarizing the algorithm which defines our model,
the following operations are performed in each step.
(i) Calculate amount of the commodity, attempted to
buy by producers (Eq. (1)) and speculators (Eq. (2)).
(ii) Calculate demand and offer and from them the
new price, according to (3) and (4).
(iii) Calculate new values of capital, stock and money
according to (5), (6), and (7).
The following actions are performed periodically.
(iv) If the step is a multiple of 57, randomly chosen
speculator changes randomly its strategies. If the step is
a multiple of 120, wealth is added to producers.
An important property of the above algorithm is that
the game has minority character. Indeed, because the
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price is established after the attempted traded amounts
∆Si were fixed, it is an advantage to sell, if the price
goes up and buy, when the price comes down. Therefore
this means that going counter the majority is an. This
enables us to decide, what score should be attributed to
the strategies: those leading to minority side receive +1
point, those which lead to majority side, receive -1 point.
In the abstract minority game [18,19] it was possible only
for less than half players to be on the minority side, of
course. The presence of producers, however, makes it
possible for any number of speculators to have minority
strategy, at least in principle.
III. RESULTS
The fundamental variable of our model is the price.
A typical time evolution of price is shown in Fig. 1.
The long-time average of price grows, due to the fact,
that capital is regularly injected into the system. We
observed, that the increase of price is higher if the capital
influx is higher. We measured also the price fluctuations.
We observed, that the relative price fluctuations remain
constant in the long-time average, so that the absolute
fluctuations grow with time with the same rate as the
long-time average of price does.
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FIG. 1. Price averaged over 10 steps, for for Np = 50,
Ns = 1000, M = 10, ǫ = 0.01, δ = 0.001, η = 0.001.
One of the main questions is, how the relative price
fluctuations is changed by the presence of the specula-
tors. We define the the time-averaged relative price fluc-
tuations using exponential averages [17]
f =
√√√√√
∑T
t=1 λ
T−t+1x2(t)
∑T
t=1 λ
t
(∑T
t=1 λ
T−t+1x(t)
)2 − 1 (8)
where T is duration of the simulation run and the pa-
rameter was chosen λ = 0.9999.
The relative weight of the speculators compared with
the producers is the quantity ξ = Nsδ/Npǫ. Figure 2
shows the dependence of the time-averaged relative price
fluctuations on ξ. We can see a pronounced minimum
around ξ = 0.5, which suggests, that from the point of
view of the price stability, there is an optimal weight of
the speculators.
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FIG. 2. Relative price noise for Np = 50, Ns = 1000,
M = 10, ǫ = 0.01, η = 0.001 Duration of the run is 105.
Data are averaged over 10 independent runs.
This phenomenon can be better understood, when we
observe the participation of producers (pp) and specula-
tors (ps), defined as the percentage of those, who take
part in the trading. The Fig. 3 shows the time depen-
dence of the participation in a typical run.
t=1000
p
s
;
p
p
200180160140120100806040200
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FIG. 3. Time dependence of the participation of producers
(upper pair of curves) and speculators (lower pair of curves),
for Np = 50, Ns = 1000, M = 10, ǫ = 0.01, δ = 0.0001
and two values of η = 0.005 and η = 0.001. The arrows are
pointing to the curves corresponding to η = 0.001.
After a transient period, the participation fluctuates
around a stationary value, which grows with the capital
influx η. The dependence of the time-averaged partici-
pation on the parameter ξ is shown in the Fig. 4. The
most important observation is the substantial decrease
of the participation of the speculators for the value of ξ
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close to 0.5. The participation of producers has a shallow
minimum around the same value ξ = 0.5, which is also
close to the position of the minimum in the relative price
noise.
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FIG. 4. Average participation of producers (+) and spec-
ulators (×) for Np = 50, Ns = 1000, M = 10, ǫ = 0.01,
η = 0.001. Duration of the run is 105 steps. Data are aver-
aged over 10 independent runs.
The following picture arises from these observations.
If the speculators are too prudent (small δ), the price
fluctuations are high, because of the demand-offer dise-
quilibrium. The price changes follow a periodic pattern
induced by the periodic quenched pattern of trading of
each individual producer. Speculators are able to extract
the information about the periodic price changes and use
it to make profit. Because they trade with little capital
(low δ) they do not influence much the price and many
speculators can gain. On the other hand, the gain is also
small.
If the investors became more aggressive, by increasing
δ, they have larger influence on the price, which leads to
the suppression of the price fluctuations, but at the same
time their ability to use the periodic price fluctuations
to make profit is also suppressed. This results in the
fact, that less speculators have successful strategy and
less speculators participate.
There is a transition between the low-aggressivity
regime, where many speculators make little profit, and
the high-aggressivity regime, where few speculators can
make large profit. The transition occurs around ξ = 0.5
and it is characterized by optimum of the relative price
noise and also by the minimum of the participation of
the producers, which means that less producers are able
to gain. The advantage is more stable price, the disad-
vantage is less profit for the producers. This is a man-
ifestation of the common sense consideration, repeated
in all economics literature, stating that higher profit is
more risky.
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FIG. 5. Total increase of wealth of producers (full line)
and speculators (dashed line) time-averaged over 120 steps,
for for Np = 50, Ns = 1000, M = 10, ǫ = 0.01, δ = 0.00001,
η = 0.001.
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FIG. 6. Total increase of wealth of producers (full line)
and speculators (dashed line) time-averaged over 120 steps,
for for Np = 50, Ns = 1000, M = 10, ǫ = 0.01, δ = 0.0001,
η = 0.001.
In Figs. 5 and 6 the situation is illustrated by time
evolution of the increase of the total wealth of producers
and speculators, defined by
∆Wp(t) =
∑
i∈producers(Wi(t)− 1) (9)
∆Ws(t) =
∑
i∈speculators(Wi(t)− 1) . (10)
Lower δ (Fig. 5) is characterized by large fluctuations of
the capital of the producers, while capital of the specu-
lators grows slowly. When the δ is larger (Fig. 6), the
capital of producers fluctuates less, but the speculators
have significantly larger profit.
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FIG. 7. Total increase of wealth of producers (full line)
and speculators (dashed line) time-averaged over 120 steps,
for for Np = 50, Ns = 1000, M = 10, ǫ = 0.01, δ = 0.0001,
η = 0.005.
The influence of the influx of capital into the system,
measured by the parameter η, can be seen by comparing
the Figs. 6 and 7. The picture remains the same quali-
tatively, however larger influx means larger profit prefer-
ably for the producers, while the increase of the profit of
the speculators is much lower. The Fig. 3 shows, that
the participation of the producers is much more influ-
enced by the parameter η than the participation of the
speculators.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced and studied a model of open economics.
The influx of capital leads to the coexistence of produc-
ers and speculators. We showed, that the presence of
the speculators can be useful to the economics, by sup-
pression of the price fluctuations. If we increase the ag-
gressivity of the speculators, there is a smooth transition
from the regime with small, but less risky profit for the
speculators, to the regime with larger profit, but accessi-
ble to smaller fraction of the set of the speculators. The
transition occurs close to the minimum of the price fluc-
tuations, which is the optimal state for the producers.
If we accept the supposition, that the optimal strategy
for the speculators should be derived by a compromise
of the mutually exclusive requirements of risk and profit,
we can conclude, that the optimum for the speculators
lies also in the transition region. As a result, the optima
for producers and speculators lie close one to the other,
and their mutual coexistence should be better described
as symbiosis than parasitism.
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